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It has been proposed that changes in global climate have been
responsible for episodes of widespread violence and even the
collapse of civilizations1,2. Yet previous studies have not shown that
violence can be attributed to the global climate, only that random
weather events might be correlated with conflict in some cases3–7.
Here we directly associate planetary-scale climate changes with
global patterns of civil conflict by examining the dominant inter-
annual mode of the modern climate8–10, the El Niño/Southern
Oscillation (ENSO). Historians have argued that ENSO may have
driven global patterns of civil conflict in the distant past11–13, a
hypothesis that we extend to the modern era and test quantita-
tively. Using data from 1950 to 2004, we show that the probability
of new civil conflicts arising throughout the tropics doubles during
El Niño years relative to La Niña years. This result, which indicates
that ENSO may have had a role in 21% of all civil conflicts since
1950, is the first demonstration that the stability of modern
societies relates strongly to the global climate.
The idea that the global climate might influence the peacefulness of
societies1,2,11–13 has motivated a growing body of research. However,
much of the support for this idea is anecdotal and the two methodo-
logies dominating quantitative work on this problem have yielded
inconclusive results14. The first of these approaches correlates multi-
century trends in regional climate with trends in wars15,16, but such
correlations are weak16 and gradual social changes over multiple
centuries confound results. The second approach avoids confounding
trends by correlating random changes in local annual temperature or
rainfall with local civil conflicts3–7, but different statistical assumptions
have yielded different results and the notion that random local tem-
perature or rainfall shocks are analogues for global climate changes has
been criticized on three grounds: (1) the global climate may affect
many interacting environmental variables that influence conflict but
are not adequately summarized by averages of local temperature and
rainfall; (2) systematic environmental changes that occur on a planetary
scale may influence markets, geopolitics or other social systems differ-
ently than location-specific weather shocks that are uncorrelated with
weather in other locations; (3) predictable changes in climate and
unpredictable weather shocks may generate very different social res-
ponses, even if they are otherwise identical. To circumvent these
concerns, we avoid local proxies for the global climate and instead
directly relate global changes in conflict risk to movements in the
global climate: specifically, to the rapid annual shifts between El
Niño and La Niña phases of ENSO10.
ENSO may plausibly influence multiple varieties of conflict, such as
riots or genocides; however, we restrict this analysis to organized political
violence. We examine the Onset and Duration of Intrastate Conflict
data set17, which codes a country as experiencing ‘conflict onset’ if more
than 25 battle-related deaths occur in a new civil dispute between a
government and another organized party over a stated political incom-
patibility (see Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Table 1 for
data details). Following common practice17,18, a dispute is new if it has
been at least 2 years since that dispute was last active; however, indi-
vidual countries may experience conflict onset in sequential years if
the government has disputes with different opposition groups. We
define annual conflict risk (ACR) in a collection of countries to be
the probability that a randomly selected country in the set experiences
conflict onset in a given year. Importantly, this ACR measure removes
trends due to the growing number of countries18 (Supplementary Fig. 1).
In an impossible but ideal experiment, we would observe two ident-
ical Earths, change the global climate of one and observe whether ACR
in the two Earths diverged. In practice, we can approximate this experi-
ment if the one Earth that we do observe randomly shifts back and
forth between two different climate states. Such a quasi-experiment is
ongoing and is characterized by rapid shifts in the global climate
between La Niña and El Niño.
To identify a relation between the global climate and ACR, we
compare societies with themselves when they are exposed to different
states of the global climate19. Heuristically, a society observed during a
La Niña is the ‘control’ for that same society observed during an El
Niño ‘treatment’. We sharpen this comparison by separating the world
into two groups of countries: those whose climate is strongly coupled
to ENSO and those weakly affected by ENSO. If climate influences
ACR, we expect to observe the larger ENSO signal in the ACR of the
former group.
Originating in the tropical Pacific, ENSO influences virtually the
entire tropics by radiating waves through the atmosphere, linking
climates around the globe through so-called teleconnections8,9.
During an El Niño event, the continental tropics mostly become
warmer and dryer, whereas effects in mid-latitudes are generally
smaller and less consistent9,10. To capture this, we partition the globe
into two groups based on how coupled their climates are to ENSO,
separating countries into teleconnected and weakly affected groups
(Fig. 1a; see also Methods, Supplementary Figs 2–5 and Methods).
We identify teleconnected locations using surface temperature, instead
of other variables8,10, both for theoretical reasons9 and because it is
less variable with broader spatial coverage. We verify that this parti-
tion preserves the well-documented structure of ENSO’s impact on
countries’ average surface temperature9, precipitation8, and agricultural
yields and revenues20 (Supplementary Table 2 and Supplementary
Fig. 6). In the analysis that follows, we base our inferences strictly on
correlations over time between ENSO and ACR in the teleconnected
group. We analyse ACR in the weakly affected group solely to check
that there are no confounding global variables that are correlated with
ENSO.
The extremes of the ENSO cycle are distinguished by anomalies of
cool (La Niña) or warm (El Niño) sea surface temperature (SST) in the
eastern equatorial Pacific8,10. We index ENSO by NINO3 (Supplemen-
tary Fig. 1), the SST anomaly for the grey region in Fig. 1a. Our results
are insensitive to using alternative indices (Supplementary Fig. 7), but
detecting ENSO impacts requires that we account for the ‘spring
barrier’10 by averaging NINO3 from May to December rather than
over the entire calendar year (see Fig. 1b, see also Supplementary
Tables 3, 4 and Methods).
We regress the conflict measure ACR on NINO3 for both groups
and detect a large and significant increase in ACR associated with
warmer NINO3 values only in the teleconnected group (Fig. 2a, b
and Supplementary Methods). We build a linear multiple regression
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model by including linear time trends and an additive constant to all
years after 1989 (inclusive), a common technique7 to account for mean
shifts in ACR after the end of the Cold War (Table 1, rows 1–3). Using
a non-parametric regression, we find that ACR in the teleconnected
group is most responsive to strong ENSO events and is less affected by
smaller deviations from the neutral state (Fig. 2b).
In the teleconnected group, ACR is 3% in the La Niña state and rises
to 6% in the El Niño state, whereas ACR in the weakly affected group
remains at 2% for all ENSO states (Fig. 2b). This indicates that ENSO
may have affected one-fifth (21%) of all civil conflicts during this
period (see Methods).
Because ENSO events occur after the April/May ‘spring barrier’10
(Fig. 1b), we expect conflicts triggered by ENSO to occur in the later
part of the calendar year. Figure 2c, based on the subset of conflict data
available at monthly resolution, shows the within-year distributions of
conflict onsets for the teleconnected group in El Niño and La Niña
years. The distributions of conflicts are similar early in the year, with
substantial differences appearing only after ENSO events are underway.
The correlation we observe between ACR and NINO3 is robust to
the battery of statistical models advanced by previous studies3,5–7 (Sup-
plementary Methods). To ensure the entrance of new countries into
the sample do not drive our result, we restrict our sample to the post-
colonial period5 (Table 1, row 4) and estimate a country-level linear
probability model5,7 (row 5). We limit the sample to exclude African
countries (row 6) and find that the correlation is not driven exclusively
by Africa3,5,7. Further, we find that nonlinear probability models (Sup-
plementary Fig. 8), count models (Supplementary Fig. 9) and survival
models (Supplementary Table 5) produce indistinguishable results.
We find the relationship persists when alternative ENSO indices are
used (Supplementary Table 6). We estimate dynamic-panel and first-
difference models (Supplementary Table 7) and find no evidence that
patterns of serial correlation in either variable drive our results. We
expand our sample to include several influential outlying observa-
tions (1946, 1948 and 1989, see Supplementary Fig. 10) and find the
correlation persists (Supplementary Table 8). We remove country-
specific constants and trends from our longitudinal model7 and find
our estimates unchanged (Supplementary Table 9). When we include
controls for contemporaneous temperature and precipitation (Sup-
plementary Table 10) or for lagged income, political institutions and
population (Supplementary Table 11; see also Supplementary Fig. 11),
we continue to find a large and significant influence of ENSO on ACR.
We then estimate a model with all of the above controls, as well as
controls for gender balance, urbanization, age-structure, income
growth, agricultural reliance and cyclone disasters (Supplementary
Table 12 and Supplementary Fig. 12) and find that our results persist
across African and non-African countries. Finally, using standard
definitions17, we find that neither large (more than 1,000 battle deaths)
nor small (25 , number of battle deaths , 1,000) conflicts dominate
our result (Supplementary Table 13). However, we find that increasing
the required peaceful period between conflicts17 reduces the correla-
tion between ENSO and large conflicts, indicating that many of the
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Figure 2 | Conflict risk associated with ENSO. a, Time series of NINO3 and
ACR for the teleconnected group. b, Linear and non-parametric fit (n 5 54,
weighted moving average, 90% confidence intervals shaded) of ACR against
NINO3. Time trends and mean shift after the end of the Cold War are removed.
c, Solid (hatched) bars show total monthly conflict onsets in teleconnected
countries during one-third of years most El-Niño-like (La-Niña-like). Monthly




















Figure 1 | ENSO exposure over space and time. a, Red (blue) indicates an
ENSO teleconnected (weakly affected) pixel; NINO3 region in grey.
b, Correlation of monthly NINO3 with NINO3 in December. The natural
‘tropical year’ begins in May and ends the following April at the ‘spring barrier’
(grey). To match monthly ENSO data with annual ACR data, an annual ENSO
signal is isolated by averaging May–December NINO3.
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El Niño might accelerate the timing of conflicts that would have
occurred later. By examining years following ENSO events, we find
suggestive but statistically insignificant evidence that approximately
40% of the conflicts associated with ENSO are displaced in time
(Supplementary Table 14).
We evaluate the relative sensitivities of different countries by
estimating a separate regression for each country (i), decomposing
ACR into a baseline component (ai) independent of ENSO and a com-
ponent (bi) that varies linearly with NINO3: ACRi(t) 5 ai 1 biNINO3(t)
(Supplementary Methods). In the teleconnected group, low-income
countries are the most responsive to ENSO (that is, b is larger), whereas
similarly low income countries in the weakly affected group do not
respond significantly to ENSO (Fig. 3). Note that the dependence of
baseline ACR a on income is statistically indistinguishable between the
two groups.
Although we observe that the ACR of low-income countries is most
strongly associated with ENSO, we cannot determine if (1) they
respond strongly because they are low-income, (2) they are low income
because they are sensitive to ENSO, or (3) they are sensitive to ENSO
and low income for some third unobservable reason. Hypothesis (1) is
supported by evidence that poor countries lack the resources to mit-
igate the effects of environmental changes1,21,22. However, hypothesis
(2) is plausible because ENSO existed before the invention of agricul-
ture10 and conflict induces economic underperformance3,18.
Our results do not provide an estimate for the full value of a global
climate state, but we can compare the global climate to income in terms
of their individual associations with ACR. In a teleconnected country
where average income per capita is US$1,000 (ai 5 4%, bi 5 1% uC
21),
the 3 uC shift associated with a change from La Niña to El Niño
increases ACR by 3% (Fig. 3b). This change has the same magnitude
as the 3% drop in baseline ACR that is associated with increasing
average income tenfold (Fig. 3a).
Because the strong ENSO events that have the greatest influence on
ACR may be predictable up to 2 years in advance23, use of our findings
may improve global preparedness for some conflicts and their asso-
ciated humanitarian crises.
We find that the changes in the global climate driven by ENSO are
associated with global patterns of conflict, but our results might not
generalize to gradual trends in average temperature or particular char-
acteristics of anthropogenic climate change. Generalizing our results to
global climate changes other than ENSO will require an understanding
of the mechanisms that link conflict to climate. ENSO has a proximate
influence on a variety of climatological variables, each of which may
plausibly influence how conflict-prone a society is. Precipitation, tem-
perature, sunlight, humidity and ecological extremes can adversely
influence both agrarian20,24 and non-agrarian economies21,22. In addi-
tion, ENSO variations affect natural disasters, such as tropical cyclones25,
and trigger disease outbreaks26. All of these have adverse economic
effects, such as loss of income or increasing food prices, and it is thought
that economic shocks can generate civil conflict through a variety of
pathways1,3,18. Furthermore, altered environmental conditions stress
the human psyche, sometimes leading to aggressive behaviour27. We
hypothesize that El Niño can simultaneously lead to any of these
adverse economic and psychological effects, increasing the likelihood
of conflict. Furthermore, the influence of ENSO may exceed the sum
influence of these individual pathways because it is a global-scale pro-
cess that generates simultaneous and correlated conditions around the
world. This is possible if non-local processes, such as increasing global
commodity prices28 or conflict contagion6,18, strongly influence local
conflict risk. Future work will examine the relative importance of these
various mechanisms.
METHODS SUMMARY
Pixels with surface temperatures significantly and positively correlated
with NINO3 for at least 3 months out of the year are coded ‘tele-
connected’; remaining pixels are coded ‘weakly affected’. Countries
are coded teleconnected (weakly affected) if more than 50% of the
population in 2000 inhabited teleconnected (weakly affected) pixels.
Group-level time-series regressions (Table 1, models 1–4) use a con-
tinuous variable for ACR; we drop 1989 because it is a 3s outlier,
presumably because of the end of the Cold War. Group-level standard
errors are robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity. Country-
level longitudinal regressions (models 5 and 6) are linear probability
models for conflict onset with standard errors that are robust to
unknown forms of spatial correlation over distances no more than
5000 km, serial correlation over periods no more than 5 years and
heteroscedasticity21. We estimate the number of conflicts associated
with ENSO by assuming all conflicts in the weakly affected group were
unaffected and a baseline ACR of 3% for the teleconnected group would
have remained unchanged in the absence of ENSO variations. We then
project the observed sequence of NINO3 realizations onto our linear
conflict model (dACR/dNINO3 5 0.0081) and find 48.2 conflicts (21%)
were associated with ENSO. For additional details on methods, see
Supplementary Methods and replication files in Supplementary Data.
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Figure 3 | ENSO, ACR and income. For each country i, we estimate
ACRi(t) 5 ai 1 biNINO3(t). a, Baseline ACR (ai) against log income per capita
in 2007 (moving average, 90% confidence intervals shaded). Teleconnected
(weakly affected) group in red (blue), n 5 85 (n 5 75). b, Same, but for the
sensitivity of ACR to ENSO (bi).
Table 1 | Regression of ACR on NINO3 averaged May–December
1950–2004
Model Teleconnected (% uC21) Weakly affected (% uC21)
















































Standard errors in parentheses. 1% uC21 means the probability of conflict (ACR) rises 0.01 for each 1 uC
in NINO3. 1989 dropped.
*P , 0.1; **P , 0.05.
{After 1974, the set of countries in the teleconnected group stabilized at 87–91.
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